University of Mississippi

eGrove
Guides, Handbooks and Manuals

American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection

3-3-1969

Creditibility in Tomorrow's Financial Statements. Address before
Los Angeles Chapter, California Society of Certified Public
Accountants, Robert Morris Associates, Los Angeles Bank Credit
Men's Association, March 3, 1969, Los Angeles Hilton Hotel, Los
Angeles, California
Leonard M. Savoie

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_guides
Part of the Accounting Commons

CREDIBILITY IN TOMORROW'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
by
Leonard M. Savoie

before
Los Angeles Chapter,
California Society of Certified Public Accountants

Robert Morris Associates
Los Angeles Bank Credit Men's Association

March 3, 1969
Los Angeles Hilton Hotel
Los Angeles, California

CREDIBILITY IN TOMORROW'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Spring is here again, and back in Connecticut

where I live, tulips will soon be coining up in the garden.
Sometimes when I see the green leaves and the

red or yellow flowers, I think of the man who had a tulip
worth $4,000.
This tulip wasn't made of gold or platinum -

it wasn't a piece of jewelry at all.

It was a real, live

tulip, growing in the ground, and someone was willing to
pay - and did pay - the equivalent of $4,000 for the bulb

from which it grew.

As you probably surmise, the transaction I refer
to is not contemporary; it took place in Holland in the

1630's.
But that sale was not an isolated transaction.

On the contrary, there were thousands of sellers and
thousands of buyers exchanging tulip bulbs at fantastic
prices.

There is a record of one sale that took place

not for cash but by a swap of goods, and the purchaser

paid for a single bulb:

4 oxen, 8 pigs, 12 sheep, 4

barrels of beer, 1,000 pounds of cheese, one complete
bed, and a suit of clothes.
The buying of tulip bulbs - not to plant and

enjoy the flowers but to sell to someone else at a higher
price - lasted for three years.

Then the fever passed.
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In a matter of weeks, prices for bulbs fell to three-

quarters, a half, one-quarter their previous quotations.
Thousands of people were bankrupted.
This classic example of speculation became

known as tulipomania - look that up in your Funk & Wagnall’s
and you will find it listed there today.

Tulipomania was

a manifestation of what we would now call "commodity
trading."

Another hundred years had to pass before finan

cial sophistication reached a point where speculation could

take place with pieces of paper standing as symbols for

values less tangible than a commodity.
In economic history, the first instances of modern

speculative finance were the South Sea Company organized
in England in 1711 and the Occidental Company organized
in France in 1717.

cases.

The basic idea was similar in both

The companies would assume a large part of the

debt obligations of the respective governments in return
for certain monopoly privileges - trade with South America
and the Pacific islands in the case of the English venture,

exploitation of natural resources in the Mississippi Valley
in the case of the French venture.

Shares were offered to the public, and the aura
of romance surrounding the South Seas and the New World

made the stocks real glamour issues.

The prices rose

giddily, with the result that the stock could be used as
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collateral for bigger and bigger borrowings.

The promoters

issued additional shares, which were used to acquire more
properties.

Within just a few years, the price of South

Seas stock rose 700 per cent.

People from all levels of

society scrambled to get aboard.
The only catch was that the underlying assets

were not worth what the stock was selling for, nor could
they be worth so much in the foreseeable future.
The South Sea Bubble burst in England, and the

Mississippi Bubble in France, in the same year - 1720.
A few lucky speculators who had taken their profits
earlier made fortunes.

But thousands upon thousands of

people lost everything they had.

The stock of the Bank of England itself fell
by half in four months.

Many lesser banks failed.

were government investigations.

There

Some people who feared

investigation or who could not meet their debts fled
abroad.

Panic reigned.

Of course, that was long ago, and conditions

change.

Thus, it was many years later when one of the

best known economists in the United States could allay
the worries that a few people felt by declaring, "Stock

prices have reached what looks like a permanently high

plateau.”
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The economist was Professor Irving Fisher of
Harvard, and the time of this pronouncement was 1929.

Nor was Professor Fisher alone in his belief.

It was

shared by other academic economists and by such prestigious
figures as John J. Raskob, who had just resigned as chairman
of the Finance Committee of General Motors to become chair

man of the Democratic National Committee, and Charles
Mitchell, president of the National City Bank in New York.
And why not?

During 1928 the price of Allied

Chemical stock had gone from 154 to 250; Chrysler from

63 to 132; General Electric from 136 to 221.
In relating these events, I cannot help remem
bering that in a speech to the House of Burgesses in
colonial Virginia, Patrick Henry said:

"Caesar had his

Brutus; Charles the First his Cromwell; and George the
Thir
d. .

. ” - whereupon there were cries of "Treason"

from his fellow-members - and he went on ”. .
the Third may profit from their example.

. and George

If this be

treason, make the most of it."
Like Mr. Henry, I am not pushing any parallels

to conclusions.

If persons in the audience wish to do

so, that is up to them.

My reason for recalling episodes of history
is that businessmen are generally so engrossed in dealing
with the affairs of today and in planning for the future
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(as indeed they should be) that they seldom have time to
think seriously about anything that happened prior to

their own business lifetimes.

Yet; as George Santayana

has noted, "Those who fail to understand the lessons

of history are condemned to repeat its errors."
All of us here today realize that in the past
few years the stock market - or at least certain sectors
of it - have been; shall we say - exuberant.

Whether the

exuberance is of such a degree as to imply a widespread

danger, I am not enough of a prophet to say.

In recent

weeks the market has drifted downward but concern over
speculation remains.

Just a few days ago the new chair

man of the SEC testified before a Congressional committee

about the causes and results of speculative activity in
the market; and recently another SEC commissioner spoke
of "the undesirable effects of the super-heated speculative
fever now existing in our markets."

I would remind you that some new-issue offerings

of stock in franchised restaurants; nursing homes; and so
on - presumably priced by the underwriters at levels re

garded as reflecting fair values - have risen two, four;
or even eight times the original price in a matter of

months.

Stocks of some old-line companies, with millions

of shares outstanding; have leaped sharply in reaction to
take-over bids.

It is difficult to believe that a company

which has had a market valuation in the neighborhood; say;
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of $400 million for the past year or so is suddenly

worth 50 per cent more.
Occurrences of this sort should concern all

businessmen, since if excessive exuberance were to lead

to excessive reaction, it would be bad for all business.

And such occurrences concern certified public
accountants not only because of their function of review

ing the financial statements of companies whose shares
are traded but because, as professional men, they have
a public responsibility.
The accounting profession has taken some positive

actions to meet its responsibilities in this respect, and
it is trying to take more.
Let me make clear that CPAs are not dogmatically

against speculation.

They fully realize that, within

reasonable bounds, it plays an economically useful role.

CPAs realize, too, that the roots of speculation lie in
mankind's age-old desire to get something for nothing,
and they have no hope or intention of trying to change
human nature.

At the same time, however, CPAs realize that
speculation has undoubtedly been stimulated by some

corporate accounting practices, and they want to keep

speculative fever from being aggravated by inadequate
or potentially misleading corporate financial data.

They
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want such data to be as reliable as possible and as re

vealing as practicable.

If large numbers of the public

do not read the information or, having read it, choose

not to heed it, that is their decision.

To return for a moment to my reference to the
speculation in 17th Century Holland, if people want to pay

ridiculous prices for tulip bulbs, okay.

But they should

have the means for knowing whether they are buying tulip

bulbs or onions.
Today, the tulip bulbs are convertible preferred
stocks, convertible debentures - and the latest darling,
warrants - which some business journalists have called

"funny money."

And the investor would be well advised

to carefully tip-toe through these tulips or he may end
up in the onion patch.

All of this is part of the current

emphasis on "performance" and the creation of "instant

earnings."
The American Institute of Certified Public

Accountants is in the forefront of those trying to estab
lish fair standards of corporate reporting in the face
of the ingenious kinds of securities, and packages of

securities, conceived by imaginative financiers.

The

Institute's efforts in this direction take the form

largely of Opinions of its Accounting Principles Board.
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The efforts have had the general support of the SEC, the

stock exchanges, and a

good many bankers and businessmen.

They have also encountered business opposition.

Probably everyone in an audience such as this

is familiar with the several Opinions which the Accounting

Principles Board has issued in the past couple of years
or which it has proposed and circulated to the business
community for comment.

But let me tell you briefly about

one problem area of special significance.

As we all know, the one figure in a company’s

annual report which the average stock-buyer pays more
attention to than any other is the company’s earnings

per share.

This is the figure that is reported pro

minently in the newspapers; and, of course, it is a figure
that not only amateur investors but the sophisticated ones

also take into account.
So it’s important to note that the recent pro

nouncements made or proposed by the Accounting Principles

Board bear on the earnings-per-share figure one way or
another.
Two years ago last January the Board issued
Opinion 9, which did several things.

For one, it said

that extraordinary gains or losses should be included in

a company's reported net income.

Previously, as you

know, a company might add a nonrecurring gain to, or
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deduct a nonrecurring loss from, its net income figure,
depending on whether management felt it desirable to

raise or lower the figure.

Conversely, if management

did not want the gain or loss to affect the reported

net, it could credit or charge the amount to retained
earnings, which would not show in the income statement

but in the analysis of retained earnings.

It was more

common to see an extraordinary gain in net income and
the extraordinary loss in retained earnings.

Obviously,

this option could hamper comparison of a company's earnings
from one year to another, or comparison as between two
9

different companies.

That option has now been closed.

Opinion 9 did something else.

Customarily, a

company's formal financial statements have shown net

income as a total figure - the earnings per share figure
has been somewhere else in the report to stockholders,

probably in the President's Letter and the "Highlights
of the Year," which are in the opening pages.

An auditor renders his opinion only on the
formal financial statements - not on the President's
Letter or any other part of an annual report.

Opinion

9 "strongly recommended" that the per-share figure be
on the face of the financial statements.

Although this

was only a recommendation, many companies promptly- adopted

the practice, and it is now contemplated to make inclusion
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of the per-share figure necessary if an auditor is to give
a so-called "clean" opinion on a company’s financial
statements.

Further, Opinion 9 recommended that reports
for companies having potential dilution in earnings

applicable to common stock should carry two earnings-

per-share figures - that is, a so-called primary earnings
per share, and also a fully diluted figure to show what
the earnings would be if all convertible securities, and other

contingent issues were to be exchanged for common stock.
Still further, it said that the number of common

shares used as the divisor in computing the primary figure
should include the number of shares which could be demanded

by holders of convertible securities which derive a sub
stantial part of their value from their convertibility.

These were termed residual securities in recognition of
their substantial equivalence to common stock.

In a nutshell, the primary earnings-per-share

figure would be based on the number of common shares out
standing plus the number of shares assignable to convertible

securities having "common stock equivalency"; and the fully
diluted figure would be based on the outstanding common

plus all convertible securities, whether or not they met
the criteria of "common stock equivalency."

Opinion 9 came at an opportune time, for a wave
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of complicated securities was rising, often in connection
with mergers and acquisitions.

Some securities were so

imaginatively conceived that earnings per share computed

by the traditional method could be enhanced simply by

issuance of the security.

For example, common stock

holders might be offered in exchange for their shares

a so-called convertible preferred stock paying no dividend
but carrying

the right to convert back into common stock

at a rate increasing over the years.

Although the value

of the preferred would depend entirely on its substantial
equivalence to common stock, earnings per share computed

by the usual method would be increased because of the
reduced number of common shares outstanding.

This was

a situation the Board felt required correcting.
Opinion 9 did that, but experience with it
has revealed a need to expand and clarify the meaning

of residual securities.

The Board is now doing that.

Last November the Board exposed another proposed
Opinion on earnings per share, one that is drawing heavy
opposition from some corporate managements.

Now that

the exposure period is over and comments have been re
ceived, the APB will consider further action later this

week.
Whereas virtually everyone is agreed that
some convertible securities have so many of the market
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attributes of common stock that they ought logically to
be included with common in computing earnings per share,

the criteria for determining common stock equivalency can be

framed in different ways.

The problem lies in how and

where to draw the line between gimmicky securities which
might give rise to misleading reporting and solid senior

securities with reasonable added attractions.

A lot of

deep thinking and debate are taking place on the subject.
Very likely the Accounting Principles Board

will arrive at the conclusion that a convertible security either debenture or preferred stock - will be considered

as the equivalent of common stock when its terms are sub
stantially equivalent to those of the common stock, or

when its yield at the time of its issuance is such as to
preclude its classification as a senior security.

Thus,

if the cash yield of a convertible security is far below
the prevailing rate for non-convertible long-term debt
or non-convertible preferred stock of the same corpora
tion, the security would be considered as a common stock equivalent.

Further establishment of a minimum rate of
demarcation for common stock equivalency would go far

toward clarifying the general principle laid down in

Opinion 9.

But even without this needed clarification,
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Opinion 9 has served to effectively limit the ability of

imaginative financiers to use convertible securities

to aid in reporting "instant earnings."

Just a few days

ago, The New York Times said that John M. Hartwell,

president of the Hartwell & Campbell Fund, in connection
with his fund "pronounced the benediction on the conglom
erates which he said were hurt when the American Institute

of Certified Public Accountants changed the rules to

require conglomerates to report their earnings on a fully
diluted basis."
The attention given in Opinion 9 to convertible

securities, and the lack of attention to warrants, have
fostered a marked increase in the use of warrants to

accomplish instant performance.

This presents a new

challenge to the Boards and it is about to respond by

pronouncing that warrants -- and options and rights as
well -- should be regarded as common stock equivalents
at all times until they are exercised or expire.

Where

warrants are outstanding, earnings per share (primary
and fully diluted) should be computed by adding to the

common shares outstanding the number of common shares
issuable upon exercise of the warrants, less the number

of common shares that could be purchased with the proceeds
from the exercise of all warrants.
The objective here is not to stop the issuance

of warrants but to stop the reporting of earnings per
share without giving appropriate recognition to the heavy
impact of potential dilution.
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But this is only a part of the story of the
warrant, a truly wondrous security -- if it can bo called
that -- because of its leverage and speculative advantages.

Some companies have issued warrants to present
stockholders in exchange for nothing.

The New York Stock

Exchange, with the agreement of the accounting profession.,
has made this ploy less appealing by requiring the warrants

to be accounted for as if they were stock dividends.

That

is, retained earnings must be capitalized in the amount

of the fair market value of the warrants.

Since this

requirement has been made known, some companies have withdrawn

proposals to issue warrants.

Incidentally, the Exchange has

a policy of refusing to list long-term warrants because of

the problems they have historically created.

Warrants also have been issued in connection with
takeovers of other companies., and issuing companies have

tried to apply pooling of interests accounting to the
trans
actions.

The accounting profession has prohibited

this practice* by a less formal means than an Accounting
Principles Board Opinion.
All these actions and proposals have come about.,

not because accountants like to make life more complicated

than it is already, but because businessmen themselves

have devised complicated ways to acquire and finance
companies.

CPAs do not take a stand as to whether acqui

sitions and conglomerations are good, bad, or indifferent

from a standpoint of economic or social principle.
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to handle these matters in financial statements in a way
that will be fair to the investing public.
The accounting profession feels these problems

have to be dealt with because financing has come to

involve such a large number of warrants and convertible

issues (including some with conversion rates which change
at different periods of time) that the customary way of
computing earnings per share is no longer adequate.

Some

financing arrangements have been so structured, in fact,

as to result in what might be called "ersatz earnings."

Convertible securities have been issued particu
larly to form conglomerate companies, a phenomenon which

is drawing increasing attention from Congress and the SEC.

No less than six Congressional committees are investigating
conglomerates this year and competition for star witnesses

is likely to grow intense.

Also the popular press has

found conglomerates to be newsworthy; the cover story of
this week's Time magazine is devoted to the subject.

In attempting to shed light on conglomerate
companies, the American Institute of CPAs proposed a year-and-

a-half ago that highly diversified companies undertake an
experimental reporting of revenues and earnings by broad

industry segments as a means of helping investors appraise
corporate operations.

Last fall the SEC proposed regulations that

would require product-line reporting in registration

statements related

- 16 -

to new filings, and at that time the Institute agreed with
the objective but not with some of the details for

implementation.
A couple of weeks ago the Commission announced
a revised proposal, which gives effect to most of the

suggestions made by the Institute.

The Institute now

endorses this proposal, except for one feature which

appears to be ambiguous and potentially incapable of being
implemented.

The Accounting Principles Board is now

considering the need for an Opinion dealing with product

line figures in financial statements reported on by CPAs.
The conglomerate movement has led the profession
to take a new look also at the pooling concept.

Four

months ago, the Institute released a research study in

which the authors took the position that, except in
certain specified and relatively infrequent circumstances,

all acquisitions should be

treated

as purchases.

Not

everyone within the accounting profession or outside it

agrees with this, and the subject is under continuing

study.
Nearly everyone agrees, however, that some

tightening of accounting rules is needed in this area,
even though there is a wide diversity of views.

At

one extreme, some would add mild restraints but essentially

preserve the status quo.

At another extreme, some favor

abandoning pooling entirely, and requiring the capitalization

of goodwill and subsequent amortization by systematic
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charges to income.
Many contend that pooling-of-interests accounting
fails to provide a fair accounting for the cost of an
acquired company.

By carrying forward old historical

amounts from the books of the acquired company, the
combined enterprise avoids the capitalization and sub

sequent charge to income of high acquisition costs in
terms of cash and securities.

If poolings were outlawed

and purchase accounting required, with amortization of

all costs including goodwill, the merger movement would

be significantly curtailed.

Many if not most acquisitions

could not be justified in terms of future flow of income

if earnings had to be charged for the full costs involved.
As matters now stand, however, the tax laws and

accounting concepts, taken in conjunction, present a

situation in which Company A, whose stock has a high
price-earnings ratio in the market, can issue new shares

in exchange for the stock of Company B, which sells at
a lower P/E; and Company A's stock will instantly show
higher earnings per share even though the actual dollar

amount of earnings by the combined companies is unchanged.
Isn’t this the kind of mirage-value that attached to
the tulip bulbs?

With pooling accounting, an acquiring company
can sell investments or other assets which are undervalued
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on the books of the acquired company and report instant

earnings of sizable amounts.

With this kind of earnings

magic possible, it is no wonder that soundly-managed,

conservatively-financed companies of all sizes have

become targets for takeovers.

Even some of our very

largest banks have been sought by relatively small
conglomerates.
And this same phenomenon has prompted a

predictable defensive course of action for managements

of target companies who look over their shoulders and
see some one gaining on them.

One defensive tactic is

to revalue assets upwards to the extent possible within
the range of generally accepted accounting principles.

In 1968, there were more voluntary changes from one
acceptable accounting method to another than in any year

in recent history.

All such changes that have come

to my attention have been from a conservative method
to a liberal method - from accelerated depreciation to
straight line, from deferral of investment credit to

flow-through, from expensing of research and development
to capitalization, from lifo inventory valuation to fifo.

These changes all have the effect of reporting higher
asset values and higher current income.

That these alternatives exist is a huge problem
area for the Accounting Principles Board, which is dedicated
to narrowing the range of acceptable accounting methods.
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But with the complexity of the many specific problems,

alternatives in some accounting areas are going to continue

unless and until criteria can be established for determining

when specific methods should be used.

In the accounting profession’s drive for improved
corporate financial reporting, the banking community has

been for the most part a staunch ally.

Bankers have offered

much encouragement and cooperation to the Accounting
Principles Board in its efforts and occasionally bankers

have been among the sharpest critics of accounting followed

by business in general.

But these same attitudes have not

always prevailed when it comes to accounting and reporting
for banks.

Of particular interest to this audience are the
discussions which representatives of the accounting profession

have been having lately with representatives of the banking
business and of the regulatory authorities.

As you know,

the reports of banks to their stockholders, with a few

prominent exceptions, speak of Net Operating Earnings
the way other businesses speak of Net Income/

For example,

if the President’s Letter to the Stockholders refers to
a new record in "earnings”, Net Operating Earnings is

what is meant.

If an earnings-per-share figure is shown

on the face of the income statement, it is based on
Net Operating Earnings.
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Banks do not present a figure for "net income."
But net operating earnings do not reflect provision for

loan losses or gains and losses on sales of securities.

Bank income statements follow a format required for

reporting to regulatory agencies, who are concerned mainly
with solvency and protection of depositors.

But even

for this purpose, no one can justify the omission of a
loan loss provision from net operating earnings.

A

preferential income tax treatment complicates computation

of reasonable provision for loan losses, but it does not
make it impossible.

Loan losses are operating expenses

of banks, just as they are operating expenses of all
businesses that grant credit.

Thus, the operating results

of an entire industry are overstated.

Investors in bank

stocks need a fair presentation of income and the

Accounting Principles Board is trying to fill that need —

in the face of considerable opposition.

It is not far

fetched to say that the way banks now report to their
stockholders could be the basis for a conundrum like this
Question:

"When is a loss not a loss?"

Answer:

"When

it happens to a bank."
Both the bankers and the CPAs are in quite

close agreement conceptually, however, and although there
are details of application to be worked out, I believe

this can be done and that the reporting by banks to their

stockholders will soon be more in accord with that of the
business world generally.

This development is the more

important because of an apparently growing interest in
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bank stocks among investors.
My comments tonight have been focused on

problems of financial reporting and efforts of the APB
to deal with these problems.

This is only one aspect

of the program of the American Institute to improve

financial reporting and the professional
performance of its members.

standards of

These efforts and the self

regulation of stock exchanges and other institutions in
the financial community are essential if the free enter

prise system is to continue as we know it.

History shows that the free enterprise system

can fall into disfavor as a result of lack of foresight,
self-discipline and responsibility.

Such episodes are

unfortunate not only because the system is the most

efficient for producing goods and providing services but

because it is the one most consistent with individual
freedom.

The price of maintaining the system is constant

vigilance against excesses and laxity.

Every one of us

who plays a responsible role in it must do his part.

